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I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises from the death of Francisca Gomez that occurred at Crookham's facility
in Caldwell, Idaho. At the time of her death, Francisca Gomez was cleaning a machine called a
"picking table" inside a room called "Scancore." While cleaning the machine, her hair was
caught in a moving drive shaft (a rotating metal bar) and she died as a result.
As set forth below, Ms. Gomez's death was completely preventable. She would still be
alive today if it were not for Crookham's callous and intentional disregard for OSHA
regulations, intentional disregard of its own safety policies, its own defectively designed picking
table, and its workplace culture where Crookham intentionally disregarded employee safety in
order to get more product out the door.
Furthermore, as set forth below in detail, it is Appellant's argument that the district court
committed reversible error when it found Ms. Gomez's family's claim was barred and that
worker's compensation was their only remedy.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Design, Manufacturer, Mock-up, and Installation Process
George Crookham, CEO of Crookham Co., wanted a new picking table in the Scancore

room of the Crookham facility in order to increase seed sorting productivity and efficiency. 1 As
a result, he approached a welder in the "shop" department named Jim Bennet and asked him to

1

Clerk's Record, p. 87 .
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design a new picking table. 2 Mr. Bennet was given instructions to make the picking table the
shape of a "stop sign" and he was given a budget of approximately $70,000. 3
As a result, Mr. Bennett set to work on designing the picking table. In this regard, the
full extent of his design drawings of the picking table literally consisted of a two-page hand
drawing. 4 No evidence exists of any other design drawings with design drawing specifications. 5
There are no design drawings with measurement specifications or layout or even shape for any of
the machine guarding. This entire project was basically "eye-balled" off a stick figure drawing. 6
It would be expected that for an individual such as Mr. Bennet to be able to create a
safely working and efficient picking table with little to no design drawings or specifications, he
would have the credentials and experience to accomplish this task. The reality is that Mr. Bennett
did not have adequate training or experience-he was the wrong man for the job. In this regard,
Mr. Bennett dropped out of high school and did not get a GED, he is not a mechanical engi_neer
and has received no training in mechanical engineering, he had received no prior industrial
machine design training, had never used any computerized design software platforms, and had
no prior experience either working on a picking table or designing one. 7 In fact, the extent of his
training consists of being a self-taught untrained welder who had helped build a rear door on a
semi-trailer, a dirt eliminator, and an onion conveyor back in the late 1980's. 8

2

Id.,
Id.,
4
Id.,
5
Id.,
6
Id.,
7
Id.,
8
Id.
3

p. 91.
p. 631 (at p. 31, II. 13-25) and p. 664 (at p. 162, I. 20 - p. 164, I. 17).
pp. 687-689.
p. 636 (at p. 50, II. 4-8).
p. 636-641.
p. 626 (at p. 11, I. 15 - p. 12, I. 13.).
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Prior to the installation of the picking table in the Scancore room, Mr. Bennet assembled
a full mock-up of the picking table in the Crookham shop. 9 The mock-up was inspected in the
shop by Mr. Bennett.

10

In this regard, Mr. Bennett admitted during his deposition as a Crookham

30(b)(6) designee that he performed a lock-out/tag-out ("LOTO") on the picking table before
cleaning it himself. 11

In this regard, Mr. Bennett was asked why he turned the machine off

before cleaning it during the mock-up phase. His answer to this question was defensive and
personifies Crookham's callous "we can do no wrong" attitude toward employee safety-he
refused to admit that anything but an air wand could get stuck in the machine while cleaning
even though Ms. Gomez was scalped and killed when her hair was caught: 12
Q.

Did you actually clean the mocked up machine while it was still running?

A.

No.

Q.

Why?

A.
you.

What do you mean? What well are you-I guess I don't understand

Q.
Did you tum the-did you tum off-did you tum the mocked-up machine
off-

A.

Yes.

Q.

--before you cleaned it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why?

A.

Well, that's normally what you would do.

Q.

Why?

A.

It's just how 1-1 do things.

Q.

Why do you do it that way with that particular machine?

A.

To be safe.

Q.

Safe from what?

A.

Well, mainly not getting your hose, or your air wand caught in it.

Q.

What else?

9

Id., p. 641-642.
Id.
11
Id., p. 641-645.
12
Id.

io
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A.
What else?
Q.
Yeah. What else could you get caught in the machine if you didn't turn it
off while you are cleaning it?
A.
Nothing.
Q.
Nothing? That's your answer, nothing? Nothing can get caught in this
machine if you didn't turn if off?
A.
Well, obviouslyMR
FORD:
Is
that
a
statement
or
a
question?
MR. GAMEL: It's a question.
THE WITNESS: No. 13
The picking table mockup was then partially disassembled and taken to the Scancore
room where it was put through a final installation. 14 This is where a vital piece of testimony
from Mr. Bennett took place. During his deposition, Mr. Bennett admitted to the following facts:
1) he never evaluated the machine guarding around the drive shaft on the picking table; and that
2) although he was aware of a triangle shaped sheet metal guarding (covering) the drive shaft
above the table, the triangular sheet metal did not continue underneath the table to guard the
drive shaft from below where Ms. Gomez was cleaning:
Q.
A.

There is no other subsequent triangle then that goes under the machine, correct?
No. 15

This is a tacit admission under oath by Crookham's 30(b)(6) designee that he knew that
the triangular sheet metal that covered the top of the drive shaft did not continue underneath the
picking table in the same or similar fashion to guard beneath the picking table. This testimony
also directly contradicts Crookham's assertion that the drive shaft was covered by a metal

13

Id., p. 647 (at p. 96, I. 15 - p. 97, I. 23)(emphasis added).
Id., p. 642 (at p. 76, I. 16 - p. 77, I. 8).
15
Id., p. 645 (at p. 88, II. 19-21 ).

14
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guard. 16
Mr. Bennett also testified that he was aware of OSHA's LOTO requirements at the time
he designed and constructed the picking table, but never performed an evaluation of the picking
table to ascertain whether it actually met the OSHA LOTO requirements. 17 In this regard, Mr.
Bennett testified that he knew that the Scancore room did not have any LOTO equipment. 18
When asked why he did not provide LOTO equipment to the Scancore room for the picking
table, Mr. Bennett literally blamed the Scancore supervisors for not requesting any. 19 Mr.
Bennett was also aware of OSHA's requirements for the usage of personal protective equipment
when using mechanized equipment, but again was not aware of any evaluation done on the
picking table design to include personal protective equipment. 20 He also testified that he was
aware of OSHA's machine guarding requirements, but was not aware of any evaluation done by
Crookham on the picking table before it became operational to ascertain whether it met OSHA's
machine guarding requirements. 21 He also was not aware of any evaluations of the picking table
prior to being made operational as to whether or not it complied with any OSHA regulations
requiring warning labels, signs, and tags. 22 As a result, Crookham's 30(b)(6) designee admitted
under oath that he was aware of all these OSHA requirements, but then failed to perform a single
evaluation to ascertain whether the picking table even complied with them. He did not even

16

Id., p. 64 (at CJ[ 6).
Id., p. 646 (at p. 91, I. 20 - p. 92, I. 2).
18 d
I ., p. 647 (at p. 95, II. 1-4).
19
Id., p. 648 (at p. 100, I. 17 -p. 101, I. 11).
20
Id., p. 646 (at p. 92, II. 8-12).
21
Id., p. 646 (at p. 92, II. 3-7).
22
Id., p. 646 (at p. 92, II. 13-16).
17
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have the picking table looked at by a mechanical engineer. 23
As discussed below, Crookham's Employee Manual and Safety Manual contain detailed
requirements regarding LOTO and personal protective equipment. Incredibly, Mr. Bennett, again
testifying as Crookham's 30(b)(6) designee, did not know if the Employee Manual or Safety
Manual contained LOTO requirements. 24 He said that there were no requirements for helmets in
the manuals, which is flat out wrong, as discussed below. 25 He even testified that the manuals do
not require the picking table to comply with OSHA standards, do not require periodic safety
inspections, did not require periodic hazard assessments, and did not create a safety committee. 26
As discussed below, Mr. Bennett testimony in this regard was completely false.
Part of the installation required an electrical system to be hooked up to the picking table
to make it run. The electrical installation was performed by a licensed electrician and Crookham
employee, also from the shop, named Jim Haylett. 27 Mr. Haylett also testified as a 30(b)(6)
designee. In his deposition, Mr. Haylett testified that there were no electrical designs or drawings
ever generated for the picking table. 28 Rather, all Mr. Haylett did was take the electrical
components from an old picking table and put them on the new one. 29 In this regard, Mr. Haylett
also admitted under oath that he utilized LOTO on the picking table while he performed his work

23

Id., p. 646 (at p. 91, II. 8-11 and p. 92, II. 17-21).
Id., p. 646 (at p. 93, II. 6-16).
25
Id., p. 646 (at p. 93, II. 17-24).
26
Id., p. 646 (at p. 94, II. 2-14).
27 d
I ., p. 661 (at p. 151, II. 12-17); p. 693 (at p. 6, II. 17-19); and p. 694 (at p. 10, II. 20-23).
28
Id., p. 694 (at p. 10, II. 17-19 and p. 11, II. 4-7).
29
Id., p. 694 (at p. 10, II. 20-23).
24
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in order to prevent injury to himself. 30 He also personally viewed Ms. Gomez's body in the
machine after she was killed and provided a first-hand account in his deposition that Ms.
Gomez's hair was wrapped around the drive shaft. 31

B.

Crookham Employee Manual
As part of discovery in this case, Appellants were provided with the Crookham Employee

Manual in affect at the time of the incident. 32 It is dated May 5, 2014 and was approved by
George Crookham on the same date. According to the Employee Manual, Crookham 1) will
discipline any employees who fail to comply with company safety rules, including the failure to
report unsafe working conditions; 2) Crookham is committed to a safe workplace; 3) Crookham
employees are required to report all unsafe working conditions so the hazards can be corrected;
and 4) Crookham management recognized its obligation provide a safe work environment with
safe equipment and to establish safety training practices and again reiterated the importance of
the immediate reporting of unsafe working conditions. 33

C.

Crookham Safety Manual
As part of the discovery in the case, Appellants were also provided the Crookham Safety

Manual. 34 The Safety Manual was in affect at the time of the incident in this matter and was
dated September 21, 2015. 35 George Crookham approved the Safety Manual on September 15,

30

Id., p. 699-700 (at p. 31, I. 13 - p. 34, I. 2).
Id., p. 700 (at pp. 34-36).
32
Id., pp. 117-155.
33
Id., pp. 131-132 and 147 (Sections 4.3, 7.1 and 7.2).
34
Id., pp. 157-282.
3s Id.
31
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2015. 36 The Safety Manual was authored by Crookham's Safety Coordinator whose name has
been redacted by Crookham. 37 The Safety Manual includes all of the following requirements and
responsibilities:
1) Section 7.2 identifies the job responsibilities of the Safety Coordinator-a person whose
identity is being kept redacted and secret in this case by Crookham. 38
2) Section 7.3 requires Crookham's managers and supervisors to conduct periodic
documented safety inspections to identify and correct unsafe actions and conditions that
could cause accidents. 39
3) Section 7.4 requires all levels of Crookham's employees to report unsafe and defective
equipment immediately and to never use equipment with inoperative or missing guards,
safety devices, or interlocks. 40
4) Section 10 established a Safety Committee headed by the redacted Safety Coordinator. 41
5) Section 12.12 required shop and operator employees to lock-out and tagout ("LOTO")
any equipment requiring entrance into or close contact with the machinery or equipment
before cleaning the machinery or equipment. 42 The specific requirement was included to
not perform any cleaning of any equipment without following the LOTO program.
Specific instructions were given as to how to LOTO the equipment and notes that a
personal gadlock was to be given to and utilized by employees required to do such
cleaning.
6) Section 13.1 required head protection to be utilized and Section 13.3 specifically required
the usage of a helmet when engaged in activity like cleaning underneath the picking
table. 44
Id.
Id.
38 d
l ., p. 168.
39
Id., pp. 168-169; No evidence exists that Crookham performed any of the required safety inspections on the
picking table.
40
ld.,p.169.
41
Id., pp. 172-173; No evidence exists in this case that Crookham ever developed a Safety Committee.
42
Id., pp. 181-182(emphasis added); The shop employees were the employees who designed, manufactured, built,
and installed the picking table.
43
As discussed below, no LOTO equipment was provided to the Scancore employees for the picking table.
44
Id., pp. 193-194; As discussed below, no head protection, including helmets, were provided to the Scancore
employees, including Ms. Gomez, while cleaning the picking table.

36

31
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7) Section 13.5.6 required documented hazard assessments to be performed to determine if
personal protective equipment ("PPE"), such as helmets, were needed in areas around the
facility. 4
8) Section 17 sets forth specific detailed requirements for monthly safety inspections by
department managers. The redacted Safety Coordinator was also required to conduct
safety inspections with the plant manager at least twice per year as well. The purpose of
the safety inspections was to identify and remedy unsafe working conditions.
Documentation of the safety inspections was to be sent to the redacted Safety
Coordinator. 46
9) Section 21 required Crookham to perform accident investigations, including "near
accidents" and "near misses." Reports of these accident investigations were sent to the
Safety Coordinator. 47
10) Section 22 required all managers, supervisors, and employees to be trained at least twice
per year on accident prevention. 48
11) Section 26 again set forth in detail the mechanics and importance of the LOTO safety
program. 49
12) Section 33 developed an emergency response team to "define, respond, and correct
potential emergency response conditions as well as analyze any emergency conditions
that have occurred for corrective action." Written guidelines were to be generated along
with an emergency action plan. 50

D.

Crookham Seed Conditioning Guide
As part of discovery in this case, Appellants were provided with a document called the

45

Id., pp. 196-197; No documented PPE hazard assessments exist in this case.
Id., pp. 203-206; No evidence exists in this case that any safety inspections occurred in the Scancore room.
47
Id., pp. 213-216; Crookham denied any prior picking table related accidents, but did not deny prior near misses.
Id., pp. 43 (CJ[ 16) and 66 (CJ[ 15). Also, Crookham has refused to provide documentation of accident investigations or
even the identity of the Safety Coordinator in possession of those investigations.
48
Id., pp. 216-218; No evidence exists that any such training took place specific to the picking table.
49
Id., pp. 229-233; No evidence exists of any LOTO equipment in the Scancore room or of a documented LOTO
firogram prior to Ms. Gomez's death.
0
Id., pp. 245-246; No evidence exists in this case that an emergency response team, guidelines, or action plan were
ever created.

46
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Seed Conditioning Guide (the "Guide"). 51 The Guide is dated November 13, 2015 and was
approved by George Crookham on November 2, 2015. 52 Section 3 of the Guide defines its
purpose as follows:
The purpose of this Seed Conditioning Guide is to identify relevant quality system
processes managed by the Seed Conditioning department and to provide a link
between those processes and the Crookham Quality Management System (QMS)
as defined by CCO-QM, Quality Manual. 53
In order to achieve the stated purpose of identifying "relevant quality system processes,"
the Guide at Section 5 sets forth the "Roles and Responsibilities" of the Seed Conditioning
Manager and supervisors and at Section 7 .11 of the Guide, specific requirements are set forth for
the Scancore employees. 54 With regards to the Seed Conditioning Manager, it is noted in the
Guide that he is responsible for managing existing plant facilities and equipment to make sure
they are in appropriate working condition. This individual was also required to "[c]hampion
safety processes" by actively working to "prevent/eliminate hazards that cause injury or
illness." 55 The Guide also required the Supervisors to monitor and ensure laborers are following
safety procedures and good housekeeping practices and to stop work in the case of any safety
issues and report those issues to "the Seed Conditioning Manager and/or Human Resources

51

Id., pp. 284-329.
Id.
53
Id., p. 287; Crookham has not produced the Quality Manual.
54
Id., pp. 287-291 and p. 319-320; As noted above, Ms. Gomez was a Scancore employee and was killed in the
Scancore room.
55
Id., p. 288; No evidence exists in this case that the Seed Conditioning Manager performed any inspections of the
picking tables or the picking table cleaning system as required by the Guide.
s2
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immediately for resolution."56
A vital and troubling provision within the Guide is found at Section 7 .11. 57 The reason
that Section 7 .11 is both vital and troubling is because in that section, George Crookham created
an exclusion to the Safety Manual's LOTO rules. In fact, the exception created by Mr. Crookham
was specific to the Scancore picking tables. In this regard, the LOTO requirements contained in
the Safety Manual were approved by George Crookham on September 15, 2015. 58 The Guide
was subsequently approved by George Crookham on November 2, 2015, including Section
7.11. 59 Only supervisors were allowed to tum the picking table on prior to the start of the shifts
and according to that section, only supervisors were authorized to tum the picking tables on and
were to do so 30 minutes prior to the shift. 60 Additionally, the Scancore tables, which include
the picking table at issue in this litigation, were expressly required to "run constantly during the
shifts."61 Absolutely no exceptions are contained within these requirements to tum the machine
off for cleaning and no authorizations were given to any employees to do so. As a result, George
Crookham himself intentionally and expressly bypassed the LOTO requirements from the Safety
Manual in order to require the picking tables to be run constantly pursuant to the subsequently
approved Guide. As a result, the Scancore room supervisors and managers were under
instruction from George Crookham himself, in writing, to ignore the Safety Manual LOTO rules
56

Id., p. 289; No evidence exists in this case that the Scancore supervisors reported the inadequate machine guarding
or lack of LOTO equipment in the Scancore room prior to Ms. Gomez's death as required by the Guide and Safety
Manual.
57
Id., pp. 319-320.
58
Id., p. 157.
59
Id., p. 284.
60
Id., pp. 319-320.
61 Id.
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in the Scancore room and specifically with regard to the operation of the picking tables. 62
E.

OSHA Report and Citations

As a result of Ms. Gomez's death, OSHA performed an investigation and issued a report
with citations and penalties. 63 With regards to the picking table that killed Ms. Gomez,
Crookham was given the following citation:
Citation 2 Item 1
Type of Violation: Serious
29 CFR 1910.219(c)(2)(i): All exposed part(s) of horizontal shafting seven (7)
feet or less from floor or working platform were not protected by stationary
casing(s) enclosing shafting completely or by trough(s) enclosing sides and to of
sides and bottom of shafting.

(a) Building 26, seed sorting area. On January 21, 2016 at time prior thereto
employees were exposed to unguarded rotating horizontal drive shafts while
cleaning under the equipment.
Proposed Penalty: $6,30064

On March 29, 2016, OSHA drafted a letter to a redacted individual in which OSHA
reiterated that they had conducted an inspection as a result of Ms. Gomez's death and determined
that Ms. Gomez was killed while she "was working to clean a seed sorting machine when her
hair and hair net became wrapped around an unguarded drive shaft under the machine." 65 OSHA

62

It is important to remember that the LOTO rules from the Safety Manual were put in place in order to protect
employees from injury or death. A requirement to bypass the LOTO rules is nothing short of an intentional and
flagrant disregard for employee safety and Ms. Gomez lost her life as a result of this decision.
63
Id., pp. 331-356.
64
Id., p. 343.
65 d
I ., pp. 331.
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provided a picture of the unguarded drive shaft to Crookham. 66 Crookham did not appeal the
violation, citation, and penalty from OSHA and paid the fine. 67
Despite the OSHA findings, the OSHA photograph, Crookham's payment of the penalty
without appeal, and even the notification by OSHA of how Ms. Gomez died inside the picking
table, Crookham has taken the position that OSHA was wrong and that the picking table was
actually properly guarded. 68 In this regard, absolutely no evidence has been produced in this
case to support Crookham' s conclusory argument.

F.

Industrial Hygiene Reports
Subsequent to Ms. Gomez's death, Crookham retained an individual named Matthew

Call, a Board Certified Safety Professional, to perform a safety inspection of the Scancore room.
Mr. Call generated a report of his findings dated January 28, 2016, which was sent to Gregg
Peterson, who is identified as the PE Manager for Crookham.69 Mr. Call concurred with OSHA
that the primary hazard that existed on the picking table was with the mechanical power
transmission shaft [drive shaft] "that curves around the perimeter via universal joints (U-joints)
underneath the table" and that machine guarding needed to have been in place to prevent contact
with the drive shaft and U-joints. 70 Mr. Call further noted that although machine guarding had
been put in place after Ms. Gomez's death to prevent any additional contact with the drive shaft
and U-joint beneath the table, additional machine guarding still had to be put into place to protect

66

Id. , pp. 356.
Id. , pp. 350-353.
68
Id., p. 64
69
Id., pp. 358-382.
70
Id., p. 358.
67
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against an additional "gap that was large enough that a part of a person's body or clothing could
fit through it and contact the shaft, U-joint, or roller of the conveyor system."71 Mr. Call even
took photographic evidence of the gap and included it with his report. 72
Mr. Call also found additional safety issues with the picking table. Mr. Call noted the
lack of an implemented and audited Lockout-Tagout Program and lack of Lockout-Tagout
equipment. 73 Mr. Call also noted that the lack of safety training to "protect employees from such
hazards, namely the machine guarding, lockout-tagout, and no loose clothing policies." 74 Mr.
Call further noted the lack of danger and/or warning signs around the room and also noted the
lack of training of employees as to the functionality and location of emergency shut-off
switches. 75 It is important to note that all of these specific safety concerns raised by Mr. Call
concern items that were already previously required to be in place pursuant to the Employee and
Safety Manuals. Mr. Call's report highlights the undeniable fact that Crookham intentionally
ignored is own safety rules prior to Ms. Gomez's death.
Additionally, despite the fact that Ms. Gomez had just died at its facility, Mr. Call made it
clear in his report that his inspection was "limited by agreement of the parties based upon
financial and other considerations." 76 One specific limitation noted in his report was that the

l d., p. 359.
Id., p. 380; Again, Crookham is now disputing not only the OSHA findings, but also Mr. Call's findings regarding
inadequate machine guarding-even though Mr. Call was hired by Crookham itself.
73
Id., p. 359.
74 Id.
1s Id.
76
Id., p. 367.
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inspection "did not include an evaluation of the safety management practices at Crookham." 77
As a result, Mr. Call cautioned Crookham that "[p]ositive management practices such as
allowing employees more time to apply lockout-tagout before cleaning or providing efficient
means for employees to voice safety concerns without retaliation are effective in improving the
safety culture of a company." 78 This is a glaring limitation in Mr. Call's report. Crookham's
intentional disregard for employee safety was a top-down issue involving ownership, managers,
and supervisors who were actively and consciously disregarding

employee safety

requirements-yet, Crookham's management did not allow Mr. Call to assess Crookham's safety
management policies and practices.
On April 8, 2016, Mr. Call generated a second report concerning another area of the
Crookham facility. 79 In that report, it was noted that an onion conveyor belt assembly was unsafe
and required additional machine guarding, warning signs, an additional emergency shut-off, and
that employees needed to stop wearing loose clothing. 80 Again, all of these items raised by Mr.
Call in the second report concern items that were already previously required to be in place
pursuant to the Employee and Safety Manuals.

G.

Form300A
A troubling aspect of this case is not only that Ms. Gomez's death was easily preventable

if Crookham had followed known and elementary safety policies, but also that Crookham's
conduct in causing the safety violations pointed out in the OSHA and Industrial Hygiene Reports
77

78
79
80

Id., p. 360.
Id.
Id., pp. 378-382.
Id., p. 378.
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are simply inexcusable. According to its website, Crookham "is a family owned wholesale
company that has been in business since 1911."81 It is nothing short of outrageous that a
company that has existed for literally 116 years could operate a facility with such rampant safety
problems. It is outrageous that a company that has 116 years of experience dealing with
employee safety could fail at the most basic levels of employee safety-like providing LOTO
padlocks, helmets, safety inspections, and covering moving parts on machines adequately.
Simply, 116 years is way too long to be in business to be able to claim with any validity that the
lack of LOTO, safety inspections, helmets, and machine guarding is anything but intentional.
For that matter, it is mere common sense that a company with 116 years of experience
should have a stellar safety record. However, the fact of the matter is that Crookham's safety
record is rather abysmal. When OSHA did its investigation, Crookham provided OSHA with a
completed 300A Form, which tracks the number of employees and work injuries in a given
year. 82 According to this form, in 2015, Crookham employed an average of 151 employees and
of those employees, approximately 33 of them reported work injuries. 83 This means that nearly
22% of Crookham's workforce reported work injuries in 2015 alone. That is a shockingly high
number, especially for a 116 year old company.

H.

Declaration of Elena Gomez and Prior Osha Violations
Elena Gomez ("Elena") is a Plaintiff in this matter and provided a Declaration dated
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See the About Us tab at www.crookham.com.
Id., pp. 384-385.
s3 Id.
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August 1, 2017. 84 Elena's Declaration provides a first-hand account of communication that
occurred between herself and George Crookham after Ms. Gomez's death. In part, the
Declaration sets forth the following:
1) Elena is one of Ms. Gomez's children and she spoke with, emailed, and met with
George Crookham after her mother's death.
2) George Crookham admitted that Ms. Gomez' s death was preventable.
3) George Crookham admitted that he "knew what they should have done" to the
picking table.
4) George Crookham knew that the picking table was being cleaned while running,
doing so was intentional, and was done for the purpose of preventing the crosscontamination of seed varieties.
5) George Crookham did not believe Ms. Gomez did anything wrong and did exactly
what she was supposed to do to clean the machine.
6) George Crookham told Appellants to sue him because worker's compensation
benefits "would be a joke."
7) George Crookham denied any prior OSHA violations for lack of machine guarding
via an email to Elena. As a result, Elena emailed him prior citations from OSHA for
lack of machine guarding and a prior LOTO violation. George Crookham did not
respond.
8) George Crookham did not believe that his company was required to inspect the
picking table for safety.
As noted in the Guide above, the picking table was required to be cleaned while running.
The Guide showed the express requirement that this be done.

Elena's Declaration contains

nothing short of a tacit admission by George Crookham that he knew the picking table was to be

84

Id., pp. 387-462.
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kept running while cleaning, but even explains the reason for it. 85 Furthermore, the prior OSHA
violations for failure to LOTO and provide adequate machine guarding is additional evidence
that Crookham was on direct notice that these were important safety issues. Yet, Crookham
intentionally ignored them in order to prevent the cross-contamination of seeds. In short,
Crookham knowingly and intentionally placed corporate profits over employee safety.
I.

Affidavit of Olga Olvera

Olga Olvera is a former Crookham employee and provided an affidavit in this case. 86
Ms. Olvera's affidavit provides a first-hand account from an actual former picking table cleaner
and actual cleaning partner of Ms. Gomez herself into the intentional safety violations occurring
on a daily basis at Crookham prior to Ms. Gomez's death:
1) Ms. Olvera was an employee in the Scanore room, was Ms. Gomez's cleaning partner,
and was present in the Scancore room at the time of Ms. Gomez's death.
2) Ms. Olvera's job responsibilities included cleaning the picking table that killed Ms.
Gomez. Ms. Olvera never received any on the job training or written training instructions
on how to safely clean the picking table. She never attended any meetings in which how
to safely clean the picking table was discussed. She was never provided any protective
clothing or equipment to wear, other than ear plugs and a mask, while cleaning the
picking table.
3) Prior to Ms. Gomez's death, Ms. Olvera was warned by another employee in the
Scancore room that it was dangerous to clean the picking tables and to be careful. Ms.
Olvera was informed that there had been a prior near-miss incident involving the picking
table where another employee cleaning underneath the picking table had her hair tugged
on by the machine. The employee was able to pull herself from the machine before
becoming completely caught. Ms. Olvera was told that this near-miss incident had been
reported to the Scancore Supervisor. 87 The employee was told to go back to work.
85

Id., p. 388.
Id., pp. 464-470.
87
As discussed below, Nelda Cardona denied this near-miss incident was reported.
refused to produce the accident investigation reports themselves.
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However, Crookham has

4) After the near-miss incident, no changes were made to the picking table to make it safer
and no helmets or other protective headware was provided to the employees while
cleaning the picking table. One employee started wearing a hoodie to keep her hair from
getting caught in the picking table.
5) The way the picking table was designed, it was necessary for Ms. Olvera to kneel down
on her hands and knees at an opening at the bottom of the picking table and crawl up to
waist deep into the machine to clean underneath it. To accomplish this, she used an air
wand to blow air underneath the machine while she was physically underneath the
machine herself. To blow above her while underneath the machine, Ms. Olvera would
have to get into the machine then twist at the waist and try to blow above her with the air
wand.
6) While cleaning underneath the picking table, she could see moving parts of the machine,
such as belts and chains, that were directly above her head. These parts of the picking
table were on and moving during cleaning. Crookham knew the picking tables were
being cleaned while running. In fact, a supervisor in the Scancore Room named Isabel
Paz stood over Ms. Olvera and other employees during cleaning and while the picking
table was running. Ms. Paz would tell the cleaning employees spots to point the wand
and clean while the employees, including Ms. Olvera, were underneath and inside the
picking table.
7) Employees were scared to clean underneath the cleaning table. One employee refused
because it was too dangerous, so Isabel Paz cleaned the picking table for her.
8) In the moments leading up to Ms. Gomez's death, Ms. Olvera was in the Scancore room
cleaning underneath a picking table with Isabel Paz standing over her telling her to clean
different parts of the machine. Ms. Olvera was aware that Ms. Gomez was cleaning
another picking table and she became concerned that Ms. Gomez had not moved from the
picking table in too long. As Ms. Gomez's cleaning partner, Ms. Olvera wanted to check
on Ms. Gomez, but Ms. Paz kept telling her to clean her own machine. At that moment,
Ms. Olvera heard a lout "POP" sound and looked back at where Ms. Gomez was and
knew something was wrong. Ms. Olvera started screaming at Ms. Paz to turn Ms.
Gomez's machine off. As a result, Ms. Olvera believes Ms. Paz ran to a button on a wall
and started pushing it-but Ms. Gomez's machine would not turn off. Ms. Gomez's
picking table kept running and Ms. Olvera heard three more loud "POP, POP, POP"
sounds coming from Ms. Gomez's picking table. Ms. Olvera kept screaming at Ms. Paz
to turn the picking table off and Ms. Paz kept screaming that she did. At that moment,
Ms. Olvera saw Ms. Gomez move her legs and free an arm from the picking table and
scream for help. As Ms. Gomez screamed for help, the belt on Ms. Gomez's picking
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table lifted up and kept running. Ms. Gomez then went limp and silent. Blood started
pooling at the bottom of the picking table. Another supervisor in the Scancore room
called for help on a company intercom system-but it was far too late. Ms. Gomez was
killed. 88
9) After Ms. Gomez's death, a group meeting was attended by the Scancore employees and
supervisors. The employees raised the concern that there was no way to turn the sorting
table off at the picking table itself. Nelda Cardona responded that there was a button
underneath the table to turn it off. The employees did not know about the button. 89
10) Modifications were made to the picking table after Ms. Gomez's death. However, a large
gap was left unguarded on the picking table. 90 Nelda Cardona required Ms. Olvera to
stick her arm through this gap near moving equipment underneath the machine to clean
the machine.
11) After Ms. Gomez's death, Ms. Olvera worked in another part of the facility where onions
are processed. This required Ms. Olvera to work near conveyors that moved onions. The
conveyors did not have adequate machine guarding and grabbed Ms. Olvera's clothing.
Ms. Olvera reported this to her supervisor. The supervisor repeatedly asked the shop
employees to come fix the problem and they did not do so while Ms. Olvera was working
in that area of the facility despite the clear danger to employees. 91

J.

Expert Report of Dr. Adam Aleksander

Crookham filed its motion for summary judgment without the support of any expert
opinions-George Crookham is not a qualified expert on any issues pertaining to this case. To
the contrary, Appellants retained Dr. Adam Aleksander, Ph.D, P.E., C.S.P, who generated an
expert report. 92 Although Dr. Aleksander's findings will be discussed at greater length below, he
made the following determinations:
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Id., p. 472 (Surveillance Video).
No evidence exists in this case that any such button exists-even in the deposition testimony of the employees
who designed, constructed and installed the picking table and picking table electrical system.
90
This gap was discussed in Mr. Call's Industrial Hygiene Report. Id., p. 359.
91
As noted above, Mr. Call was asked to evaluate the onion conveyors in his second report and found safety
violations. Id., pp. 378-382.
92
Id.,pp.517-529.
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1) Crookham's intentional, negligent, and reckless design, manufacture, mock up and
installation of the picking table ignored fundamental principles of workplace safety and
was done in contravention of the Crookham Safety Manual and OSHA requirements.
2) Crookham deliberately ignored safety concerns such as machine guarding and LOTO that
were known to the design team and intentionally excluded such safety features from the
operation of the picking table.
3) Upon review of the depositions of Crookham's 30(b)(6) designees, Dr. Aleksander
determined that although Crookham was aware that LOTO was required for the picking
table, and was even utilized in Crookham's mock-ups, Crookham intentionally avoided
utilizing LOTO in the operation of the picking table;
4) The picking table was utilized on a daily basis knowingly and intentionally in noncompliance with the Safety Manual that specifically set forth dangers inherent in not
using the LOTO.
5) As a result of Crookham's intentional, negligent and reckless operation of the machine, it
was just a matter of time that and a foregone conclusion that an injury would occur and
Crookham's intentional, negligent and reckless acts subjected its employees to injury and
even death.

III.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the Court erred in finding Idaho Code § 72-209(1) applies to this

wrongful death case.
B.

Whether the Court erred in finding that Respondent met the burden that Mrs.

Gomez's death is covered by the Worker's Compensation Act.
C.

Whether the Court erred in finding that the Appellants' claims are barred as a

matter of law by the exclusive remedy rule.
D.

Whether the Court erred in finding Counts I, II, III and IV of Appellants'

Complaint fail as a matter of law.
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E.

Whether the Court erred in concluding that the Idaho Workers Compensation Act

provides the exclusive remedy to Appellants.
F.

Whether the Court erred in awarding Respondent's costs.
IV.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Appellants request their attorney fees and costs associated with bringing this appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 54(e),
I.AR. 41, and all other applicable state law.
V.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a district court's decision to grant summary judgment under the same
standard employed by the district court. In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 446, 147 P.3d 75,
78 (2006). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a).
"A material issue of fact, for summary judgement purposes, is one that is relevant to an element
of the claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the case." Rife v. Long,
127 Idaho 841, 849-50, 908 P.2d 143, 151-52 (1995) (citing United States v. Grayson, 879 F.2d
620 (9 1h Cir. 1989). "[T]his Court construes disputed facts, and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from the record, in favor of the non-moving party." Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154
Idaho 686,690, 302 P.3d 26, 30 (2013).

APPELLANTS' BRIEF- 22

VI.
ANALYSIS
As set forth below, the district court committed multiple reversible errors in holding 1)
that the Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over industrial death claims; 2) that the
Exclusive Remedy Rule is a bar to industrial death claims; 3) that Ms. Gomez's death would
qualify as an industrial accident as defined by the Idaho legislature; 4) that the Appellants have
failed to meet their burden of proof that the exception to the Exclusive Remedy Rule applies; and
5) that Crookham is not liable pursuant to the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act.

A.

The District Court committed reversible error in determining that the Idaho
Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over industrial death claims
pursuant to I.C. § 72-201.
LC. § 72-201 (the "Police Power Statute" or "PPS") has the purpose of creating a no-fault

workers' compensation system in which no work related injuries or occupational diseases can be
prosecuted in civil court "except as is in this law provided." The PPS created the general rule
that claims arising from work-related injuries and occupational diseases shall be within the
jurisdiction of the Idaho Industrial Commission. In this regard, the statute "declares that all
phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for
injured workmen ... is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of
every other remedy, proceeding, or compensation ... and to that end all civil actions and civil
causes of action for such personal injuries ... are hereby abolished." (Emphases added).
Appellants do not deny that the PPS grants jurisdiction to the Idaho Industrial
Commission in certain types of cases. Those types of cases are actually expressly identified
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within the statute. Specifically, the PPS expressly granted jurisdiction to the Idaho Industrial
Commission in cases involving industrially-related personal injury and occupational disease
cases. However, the PPS is silent on industrially-related death claims.
Despite this omission, the district court held that death claims are nonetheless within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Idaho Industrial Commission. To reach such a holding, it would
have to be assumed that the Idaho legislature enacted the PPS with the intent to include industrial
death claims without expressly naming that cause of action.

This assumption lacks merit

because industrial death claims have been given their own type of benefits, 93 were separately
defined by the Idaho legislature, 94 and were identified as a separate cause of action throughout
the Act as discussed below.
Ultimately, this holding from the district court ignores fundamental tenants of statutory
interpretation. In Jayo Dev., Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 152, 345 P.3d
207, 211 (2015) (quoting Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho
180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014)), this Court reiterated that standard applied to statutory
interpretation in Idaho:
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative
intent. Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue.
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and this
language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the statutory
language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must
be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory
construction. This is because [t]he asserted purpose for enacting the legislation
cannot modify its plain meaning.
93

94

See LC. § 72-413
See LC. § 72-102(9)
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The PPS unambiguously granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Industrial Commission in
occupational disease and personal injury cases. It is clear that the Idaho legislature understood
the difference between injuries, disease, and death claims when the Act was enacted. All the
Idaho legislature had to do to unambiguously include death claims within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Idaho Industrial Commission was to use just one word-death-but they did
not do so. As a result, the district court's holding that the PPS was inclusive of death claims
lacks merit as that determination is contrary to the plain language of the statute.

B.

The District Court committed reversible error in determining that the
Exclusiveness of Employee Remedy Statute located at I.C. §72-211 provides
exclusive jurisdiction to the Idaho Industrial Commission in industrial death
claims.
The Idaho Legislature's exclusion of death claims from the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Idaho Industrial Commission is actually consistent with I.C. § 72-211 ("Exclusiveness of
Employee Remedy Statute" or "EER"). This is a very important statute for purposes of this
appeal. It is Appellant's argument that this statute is, in fact, the Exclusive Remedy Rule in
Idaho. By its very name and nature, the purpose of the Exclusive Remedy Rule is to define the
parameters of (exclusiveness of) a worker's compensation claimant's remedy within and external
to the Idaho workers' compensation system. The purpose of the Exclusive Remedy Rule in
Idaho is to tell a Claimant, succinctly and clearly, which remedies are obtainable solely within
the workers' compensation system and which remedies may be sought within the civil courts. In
Idaho, considering the interplay between the PPS and the EER, the Idaho Legislature actually
created a very simplified Exclusive Remedy Rule that does not burden itself with a litany of
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complex causation issues. Simply, the PPS granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Idaho Industrial
Commission in personal injury and occupational disease cases and the EER made it clear that an
injured workmen's exclusive remedy for personal injury and occupational disease claims are
within the worker's compensation system, i.e. the jurisdiction expressly granted to the Industrial
Commission in the PPS actually matches the exclusive industrial remedies identified in the EER:
72-211. Exclusiveness of Employee's Remedy. Subject to the provisions
of section 72-223 (Idaho Code), the rights and remedies herein granted to an
employee on account of an injury or occupational disease for which he is entitled
to compensation under this law shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law
or otherwise, on account of such injury or disease. (Emphases added).
Consistent with the PPS, the EER is utterly silent on death claims. Again, this denotes a
clear intent by the Idaho Legislature to exclude remedies associated with an industrial death
claim from the Exclusive Remedy Rule. If the Idaho Legislature intended to include remedies
related to death claims within the EER, it would have expressly done so-but it did not.
Nonetheless, the district court held that the remedies set forth as being exclusive to the
workers' compensation system pursuant to the EER included death claims. It was the same
assumption made about the PPS-despite neither statute actually identifying death claims
expressly.

The argument for the district court's position appears to be that since the EER

identified classes of individuals such as personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, that
it must have been the Idaho legislature's intent to include death claims within the EER exclusive
remedies. However, this argument directly ignores the fact that claims for disability benefits
specific to personal injury and occupational disease cases are inheritable remedies after a worker
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dies. 95 For example, if an injured worker is owed a 7% whole person impairment rating on a
Tuesday, but dies on a Wednesday, the 7% impairment rating would still be owed to qualifying
individuals from the estate. Pursuant to the EER, the estate would have a continued remedy in
the workers' compensation system to try to collect that rating. In short, the BER supports the
Mayer holding and the premise in the workers' compensation system that personal injury and

occupational disease related benefits are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Idaho Industrial
Commission-but it is a leap too far to hold that it creates an Exclusive Remedy Rule in death
cases.

C.

The District Court committed reversible error in determining that I.C. §72-209
contains the Exclusive Remedy Rule applicable to industrial death claims.
Again, it is Appellant's position that the BER is the Exclusive Remedy Rule in and of

itself. In this regard, Appellants reject the determinations by the district court that the Idaho
legislature had the intent to place the Exclusive Remedy Rule in pieces and parts in three
separate statutes all over the Act. However, Appellants also recognize that for decades, the Idaho
Supreme Court has added a third statute into the analysis of the Exclusive Remedy Rule. This
third statute is found at I.C. §72-209 ("Exclusiveness of Liability of Employer Statute" or
"ELE"). The entirety of this statute is set forth as follows:
72-209. Exclusiveness of Liability of Employer. (1) Subject to the provisions of
section 72-223, (Idaho Code) the liability of the employer under this law shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the employee, his
spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
(2) The liability of an employer to another person who may be liable for or who
95

See Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc. 160 Idaho 223,370 P.3d 738 (2016).
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has paid damages on account of an injury or occupational disease or death arising
out of an in the course of employment of an employee of the employer and caused
by the breach of any duty or obligation owed by the employer to such other
person, shall be limited to the amount of compensation for which the employer is
liable under this law on account of such injury, disease, or death, unless such
other person and the employer agree to share liability in a different manner.
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also
extend to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees
of the employer or surety, provided that such exemptions from liability shall not
apply in any care where the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful or
unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or
employees, the loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor and shall
not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer,
or the employer was a party thereto. (Emphases added).
It should be immediately noted that death claims are recognized three separate times

within ELE as a separate cause of action by the Idaho legislature. It was recognized as a separate
cause of action twice in subsection (2) and once in subsection (3). This is clear statutory
evidence that the Idaho legislature had the intent when enacting the Act to create a death claim as
a separate cause of action. In this regard, between the PPS, the EER, and the ELE, only the ELE
includes statutory language expressly including death claims.
As a result, if all three of the statutes are to be considered part and parcel of the Exclusive
Remedy Rule, several major issues immediately arise. First, as discussed above, the ELE
recognized death claims as a separate cause of action, but the PPS and EER did not.
Second, the ELE states in subsection (1) that it is subject to the provisions of I.C. §72223, but it does not state that it is subject to the EER and vice versa. Other than the commonality
of being subject to LC. §72-223, nothing in the language of either statute connotes an intent by
the Idaho legislature to read the statutes in tandem with each other-yet that is what the district
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court and this Court has done in order to create the Exclusive Remedy Rule and apply it to death
claims.
Third, even assuming, arguendo, that the Idaho legislature did intent for the EER and
ELE to be read together in forming an Exclusive Remedy Rule, doing so creates a very big
problem.

The EER provides for less exclusive remedies than the ELE provides for an

employer's exclusive liabilities. In other words, the EER states that the remedies for a personal
injury and occupational disease claim are exclusive to workers' compensation, while the ELE
states that employers are protected from civil liabilities in personal injury, occupational disease,
and death claims. If these two statutes were actually intended to be read in tandem with each
other by the Idaho legislature, then the types of employee's remedies identified in the EER must
be identical to the types of employer liabilities identified in the ELE-but they are not. The ELE
expressly added death claims while the EER was silent on them. Due to this, reading the statutes
together to form the remedies/liabilities equation the district court and this Court historically
have looked for in forming the Exclusive Remedy Rule forces ambiguity and a glaring
discrepancy into the statutes that does not exist if the statutes are not combined. This ambiguity
is a strong indication that the Idaho legislature never intended for the EER and ELE to be read
together.
Fourth, another issue that arises with reading the EER and subsection ( 1) of the ELE
together is that they actually identify different classes of individuals that the statutes are
applicable to. As stated above, the EER is expressly applicable to "personal representatives,
dependents or next of kin" while the ELE is expressly applicable to "spouse, dependents, heirs,
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legal representatives or assigns."

Again, it would be expected that if the Idaho legislature

intended to have the BER and ELE read together to form the Exclusive Remedy Rule, the classes
of individuals who would have exclusive remedies in the BER must match the classes of
individuals identified in the ELE-but they do not match. As a result, in reading the two statutes
together, a major ambiguity develops where there are classes of individuals such as spouses and
heirs who are not expressly identified in the BER, but who are identified in the ELE. This
ambiguity only exists if the two statutes are read together to try to attempt to place an Exclusive
Remedy Rule in the ELE. Furthermore, the additional classes of individuals can be simply
explained in the ELE-they are there because the ELE alone identifies the separate cause of
action of death whereas the ERE does not.
Finally, in considering the interplay between the PPS and the ELE, a similar major
problem arises. Again, the PPS is silent on death claims while the ELE is not. In this regard, the
PPS did not expressly grant exclusive jurisdiction to the Industrial Commission in death cases,
but the ELE created a protection against an employer's liability in death cases. In short, the way
the district court and this Court historically have read these statutes together, the Idaho
legislature generated an exemption from liability to an employer in the ELE that exceeds even
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission in the PPS. This could not possibly have been the
intent of the legislature in drafting these statutes.
Considering the arguments made above, the issue that arises is this:

If the Idaho

legislature did not intend for the ELE to contain the Exclusive Remedy Rule, then what is its
ultimate intended purpose of this statute? To answer this question, it is vital to go through each
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subsection of the ELE in order. Subsection (1) has been the great red hearing of the Exclusive
Remedy Rule discussion because if it is read in isolation, it sounds like it creates the exclusivity
that is so coveted by the Exclusive Remedy Rule. The phrase "shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability" is an enticing phrase when trying to pull this statute into the Exclusive
Remedy Rule discussion. However, Appellants ask that this Court not take the bait and look
more closely at this subsection.

Specifically, subsection (1) is expressly subject to "the

provisions of section 72-223." This is important for two reasons. First, the entirety of this
section is subject to I.C. §72-223. Second, the only express statutory language that the ELE and
EER statutes have in common is that they are both subject to LC. §72-223. Of interest, despite
this commonality, the importance of LC. §72-223 to the Exclusive Remedy Rule has largely
been left unnoticed in the lineage of Exclusive Remedy Rule cases.

From Appellant's

perspective, this was a vital error in construing the EER and ELE because LC. §72-223 is a
linchpin to removing the ELE from the Exclusive Remedy Rule analysis. The reason for this is
that LC. §72-223 provides the backdrop that explains the existence of the ELE from subsection
(1) through subsection (3). In short, the entirety of the ELE exists not to create the Exclusive

Remedy Rule, but rather to set forth the rules governing an employer's liability to a third party or
"person."
LC. §72-223 ("Third Party Liability Statute" or "TPL") contains several subsections. Of
great importance to this appeal, Subsection (1) sets forth, in pertinent part, that an injured,
diseased, or killed workman should continue to receive workers' compensation benefits even if a
third party is at fault:
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The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that the
injury, occupational disease or death96 is caused under circumstances creating in
some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages therefore,
such person so liable being referred to as the third party. (Emphases added).
In short, subsection (1) of the TPL makes it clear that an employee still has a right to
benefits (remedies) in the workers' compensation system even if the injuries or death were
caused by a third party.
Subsection (1) of the ELE then expounds on that principal.

The sole purpose of

subsection (1) of the ELE is to make it clear that not only does the employee maintain remedies
within the worker's compensation system in a case involving third party fault, but in addition the
Employer/Surety remains liable to pay workers' compensation benefits even if a third party is at
fault:
Subject to the prov1s1ons of section 72-223 [Idaho Code] the liability of the
employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the
employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representatives or
assigns.
Given its proper context with the TPL and the remaining subsections of the ELE, what
"the liability of the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of the employee" actually is intended to mean is that regardless of third party involvement or
assertions of fault or comparative negligence back and forth between the employer, the
employee, and/or the third party, the fundamental principle of Idaho workers compensation
remains that an employee was still injured in an industrial accident and so the regular no-fault
rules apply and the employer will remain liable to pay benefits to the employee. The Employer

96

This is another statutory reference to the separate nature of death claims from injury and occupational diseases.
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will maintain a subrogation interest, which is discussed both in the TPL as well as the next
subsection of the ELE, but it still must pay. '
Once Subsection (1) of the Exclusiveness of Liability of Employer statute is given its
proper meaning, the interplay of the entirety of the subparts to this statute actually flow together
seamlessly and make sense. Here is how it works:
Subsection (1) provides the rule that an Employer must still pay a Claimant worker's
compensation benefits even if a third party, the employer, and/or the employee have varying
degrees of fault in causing the accident involving a third party.
Subsection (2) then continues on with that same basic principal that an employer must
pay worker's compensation benefits even if a third party is at fault, but then creates an additional
exemption. The exemption states that where there is third party involvement and is determined
that the employer is at fault to the third party, the employer is exempt from paying damages over
and above the amount of worker's compensation benefits paid in the underlying worker's
compensation claim.

In short, Subsection (1) requires the employer to pay worker's

compensation benefits in third party cases regardless of fault, and Subsection (2) states that the
employer does not have to pay more than Subsection ( 1)' s amount of benefits to a third party:
The liability of an employer to another person who may be liable for or who has
paid damages on account of an injury or occupational disease or death arising out
of and in the course of employment of an employee of the employer and caused
by the breach of any duty or obligation owed by the employer to such other
person, shall be limited to the amount of compensation for which the employer is
liable under this law on account of such injury, disease, or death ... (See LC.
§72-209(2)(emphasis added).
So, subsection (1) of the ELE tells an employer they have to pay benefits in a claim
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involving a third-party. Subsection (2) of the ELE then tells an employer that if the employer is
found to have fault, it does not have to pay a third party more than the underlying workers
compensation benefits paid (the exemption). Then, Subsection (3) creates an exception to the
exemption from employer liability to pay more than the underlying worker's compensation
benefits. In short, Subsection (3) does not create the Exclusive Remedy Rule, it actually creates
an exception that can be utilized by a third party to get paid back more than just the underlying
workers' compensation benefits in cases where it is determined that an employer is at fault to the
third party:
The exemption from liability given an employer by this section97 shall also extend
to the employer's surety ... provided that such exemptions from liability shall not
apply in any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful or
unprovoked physical aggression of the employer ... the loss of such exemption
applying only to the aggressor and shall not be imputable to the employer unless
provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer was a party thereto.
(Emphases added).
For years, this Court has held that the "exemption" from employer liability being
discussed in Subsection (3) was referring to the Exclusive Remedy Rule. To get to that point,
this Court had to link the PPS to the EER along with Subsection (1) and Subsection (3) of the
ELE while leaving Subsection (2) of the ELE and the entirety of the TPL alone on their own
islands in between it all even though they were expressly interwoven into the statutes by the
Idaho legislature. The implication of this is the idea that the Idaho legislature had the intent in
97

The only express "exemption from liability" found in this section is the exemption found in subsection (2)
whereby the employer's liability is capped at the amount of benefits it paid thereby making the employer exempt
from paying over and above that amount regardless of its own percentage of fault. Subsection (I) does not create an
exemption from liability. Rather, quite to the opposite, it statutorily tells an employer it is liable to pay benefits even
when an employer is not at fault-which, by its very nature, is how the Act was construed as part of the "grand
compromise."
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creating the Exclusive Remedy Rule by placing bits and pieces of it all over the Act in several
different statutory provisions in various subparts that are not even expressly connected together.
The methodology of statutory construction in creating the historical Exclusive Remedy
Rule lacks merit given the plain language and contexts of the statutes. Simply, the "exemption"
in subsection (3) of the Exclusiveness of Liability of Employer statute is not a nod to the
Exclusive Remedy Rule. Rather, it is referring to the exemption created in Subsection (2)-the
prior subsection largely ignored in the Exclusive Remedy Rule lineage of cases. The Idaho
Legislature actually made it expressly clear that the "exemption" was referring to the Subsection
(2) exemption by including the language emphasized above that exemption was specific to "this
section."

This conclusion makes sense because Subsection (2) created an exemption from

liability to pay benefits over and above the worker's compensation benefits paid and then the
first two words of the next subsection in line, Subsection (3), immediately refers back to that
same exemption. It also makes sense because given its proper meaning, Subsection (2) is now
no longer on a statutory island by itself apparently shoved between two statutory subparts that
have been historically devoted to the Exclusive Remedy Rule.
The proper reading of Subsection (3) and the actual exemption it refers to also makes the
exception created in this subpart make more sense. The express purpose of Subsection (3) of the
ELE is to create an exception whereby a third party can collect damages over and above the
underlying worker's compensation benefits paid by the employer. In easy terms, an employer
will not enjoy the exemption created in Subsection (2) if a third party can prove willful or
unprovoked physical aggression (the exception) from Subsection (3). In order to show how the
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ELE works in practice, the following example is offered:
Employer is a power company that requires its employees to fix power lines
inside a hydraulic basket lift 15 feet in the air. The Employer purchased the
hydraulic basket lifts from a third party named Manufacturer. When purchasing
the hydraulic baskets, Manufacturer provided written Manufacturer's
Recommendations to the Employer that the maximum weight that could be
handled by the hydraulics is 500 pounds. After a particularly bad storm, several
power lines were damaged. Employer sent out Employees to fix the lines. To get
the job done faster, Employer put three Employees into a single basket with their
equipment instead of the normal single Employee per basket. This resulted in 700
pounds of total weight being placed in the basket. As a result, the hydraulics
failed and the three Employees are sent flying to the ground. The Employees live
but are severely injured. Each Employee files a worker's compensation claim.
Pursuant to Subsection (1) of the ELE and Subsection (1) of the TPL, the
Employer pays out workers' compensation benefits. The Employees also file a
lawsuit in district court against the Manufacturer alleging the hydraulic lift was
defective. The Manufacturer responds by filing a Third Party Complaint against
Employer for indemnity/contribution. Employer files an Answer to the Third
Party Complaint denying liability. Manufacturer settles short of trial with the
Employees for $2,000,000. Manufacturer sends a settlement demand to Employer
for $2,000,000 stating the Employer had significant liability because the
Employer knew about the 500 pound weight restriction in the basket. Employer
responds by admitting liability in that regard, but refused to offer more than
$400,000-the amount of worker's compensation benefits paid. Employer cites
to I.C. 72-209(2) as support for this position. This is where things get interesting.
Manufacturer files a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether or not
the Employer has to pay more than the underlying worker's compensation
benefits. The Manufacturer goes to the TPL for support for this position and finds
none. The Manufacturer, upon looking at that statute, realizes that the entirety of
that statute deals with the liability of a third party to an employer, and none of it
deals with the liability of an employer to a third party. So, the Manufacturer turns
to the only statutory provision in the Act that deals with the liability of an
employer to a third party for damages beyond worker's compensation benefits
paid-Subsection (3) of the ELE. Manufacturer argues that the Employer's
action of willfully and intentionally exceeding the known limitations of the
hydraulics was tantamount to a "willful or unprovoked physical aggression of the
employer" and therefore the Subsection (2) exemption does not apply and
therefore the Employer is liable to Manufacturer for damages beyond the
workers' compensation benefits paid.
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This example provides an exact real world illustration of how the subparts of the ELE
were intended to function.

Construed this way, subsection (3) takes away an employer's

arbitrary windfall protection against third party liability in the civil court system when an
employer's actions were tantamount to a "willful or unprovoked physical aggression." It is
nonsensical that an employer should enjoy the exemption from subsection (2) of the ELE against
a third party in the civil court system if an employer's behavior is proven to be so egregious as to
meet the elements of "willfull or unprovoked physical aggression." Subsection (3) of the ELE is
the only section of the entire Act that would provide protection to a third party in the civil court
system against such an arbitrary liability exemption and it was the intent of the legislature to
provide that exception.

D.

The inapplicability of the Exclusive Remedy Rule in death cases is consistent
with the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Corgatelli, Davis, Mayer, and
Wemecke.
In Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 333 P.3d 115 (2014), Davis v. Hammack

Management Inc., 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d 1261 (2017), and Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint
School Dist., 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear that

the Idaho Industrial Commission is an administrative tribunal whose authority is confined to the
provisions of the Act. The Industrial Commission does not have any authority outside that given
to it by the Idaho legislature. In this regard, the Industrial Commission does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over industrial death claims because the PPS did not expressly give it that
jurisdiction. The Industrial Commission does not have exclusive jurisdiction over remedies
associated with industrial death claims because the EER, which provides for the exclusivity of
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employee remedies, was silent on death claims. Finally, neither the Industrial Commission or
the civil courts of Idaho have the authority in the Act using the ELE to put a cap on a thirdparties' ability to obtain full and certain relief from an employer who has engaged in willful or
unprovoked physical aggression.

E.

The District Court Committed Error in determining that Ms. Gomez's death
arose from an accident as defined by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.
"Injury" is defined at IC §72-102(18)(a) as "a personal injury caused by an accident

arising out of an in the course of any employment covered by worker's compensation law.
"Accident" is defined at IC §72-102(18)(b) as "an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for
mishap, or untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be
reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury." (Emphasis
added).
Of interest, likely in recognizing that throughout the Act there are different references to
"injury" and "personal injury," the legislature further defined those terms as follows at IC 72102(18)(c):
"Injury" and "personal injury" shall be constructed to include only an
injury caused by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure of
the body. The terms shall in no case be construed to include an occupational
disease and only such nonoccupational diseases as result directly from an injury.
The Idaho legislature's identification of death being a separate cause of action in the Act,
such as in the ELE and TPL, is crucial in understanding the definition of "accident.'

As

emphasized above, in defining the term "accident," the Idaho legislature expressly included only
accidents causing injuries, not death. Death is not mentioned in the definition of accident at all.
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As a result, the plain language of the definition of accident provided by the Idaho
legislature shows additional strong evidence of an intent by the Idaho legislature to exclude death
claims from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission.

Furthermore, for this

reason, because Ms. Gomez suffered an industrial death, her death does not meet the definition
of accident as set forth above. As a result, the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction
over her death claim and it can be pursued in the civil court system.

F.

The District Court committed reversible error in 1) failing to conduct an
analysis of the consciously disregarded knowledge prong; and 2) in determining
that Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof that the exception to the
Exclusive Remedy Rule applies.

The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the Exclusive Remedy Rule at length rather recently in
the Hecla cases. 98 In the Hecla cases, this Court went into detail defining what the language
"willfull or unprovoked physical aggression" located within subsection (3) of the ELE means
and the burden of proof required.

In this regard, this Court held that the exception to the

Exclusive Remedy Rule could be proven by two methodologies.
The first method would require the Plaintiff to prove willfull physical aggression by the
employer. According to the Court, willful physical aggression occurs where there is evidence
the employer 1) committed an offensive action or hostile attack; 2) aimed at the bodily integrity
of the employee with 3) a wilfull, i.e. specific intent to injure the employee. The Court defined
specific intent as a situation where the employer wished a specific employee harm and then
effectuated some means appropriate to that end. 99 In short, this Court, by this definition,
98

Marek v. Hecla, ltd., 161 Idaho 211 , 384 P.3d 975 (2016).

99

Id.
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instituted a burden of proof tantamount to a criminal mens rea that must be proven by an injured
worker despite the Act being created to be a no-fault system. In reality, there are no other
statutory provisions within the entirety of the Act or any known administrative rules pertaining to
the Act or any other caselaw in existence construing the Act that has ever found such a burden
being placed upon a Claimant-because it is a no-fault Act. In any event, Appellant's concede
that the specific intent exception does not apply to this case as Crookham did not specifically
intend to kill Ms. Gomez.
The second method requires the Plaintiff to prove "unprovoked physical aggression" by the
employer. The Court defined unprovoked physical aggression as a situation where the employer
1) committed an offensive action or hostile attack; 2) aimed at the bodily integrity of the
employee with 3) an unprovoked, i.e. general intent to injure an employee. The Court defined
general intent to mean that the employer actually knew or consciously disregarded knowledge
that the employee injury would result from the employer's action. The Court made it clear that
to prove general intent, the employee does not have to show the employer specifically wished the
employee harm. Rather, the employee must merely prove the employer engaged in conduct that
the employer had actual knowledge "or consciously disregarded knowledge" that the conduct
would result in employee harm. 100
For purposes of this appeal, it is vital to understand that the general intent element can be
proven in two different ways-actual knowledge or consciously disregarded knowledge. In this
regard, this Court has created a disjunctive test for proving general intent. The district court only
ioo Id.
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analyzed the "actual knowledge" prong of the two-part test. Despite briefing on the consciously
disregarded prong and detailed arguments being heard on the applicability of the consciously
disregarded during the summary judgment hearing, the district court committed error by failing
to provide an analysis applying the consciously disregarded prong. Similarly, the district court
also failed to provide any analysis as to whether Crookham committed an offensive action or
hostile attack and whether that offensive action or hostile attack was aimed at the bodily integrity
of an employee. All the district court did in construing the Exclusive Remedy Rule elements
was determine whether or not Crookham had actual knowledge that their actions would have
killed an employee. In so doing, the district court failed to look at the evidence through the lens
of the "consciously disregarded knowledge" prong.
The reality is that Appellants are hard pressed to find a working definition of what
"consciously disregarded knowledge" actually means from the lineage of prior Exclusive
Remedy Rule cases. It appears to be a prong created by this Court but it does not have a
definition. Considering this Court created a disjunctive test for proving general intent with a
proof of "actual knowledge" or "consciously disregarded knowledge" being the two prongs, it
stands to reason that consciously disregarded knowledge must mean something less than or
otherwise different from actual knowledge. If "actual knowledge" means that the employer had
to actually know that its actions would cause injury or death, consciously disregarded knowledge
must mean something different than that or there would not be a disjunctive test. The district
court in this case failed to provide an analysis of this prong, let alone a definition. Appellants are
asking this Court to do so now as part of this appeal.
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Appellants did try to define what consciously disregarded knowledge could mean during
the summary judgment hearing. 101 Consciously having knowledge of something means simply
that Crookham was aware of knowledge. Disregarding knowledge that you are conscious of
simply means that you are aware of the knowledge, but you disregard it. In the context of an
Exclusive Remedy Rule case, consciously disregarded knowledge means that as an employer,
you are aware that an action you take could result in harm to an employee, but you choose to
engage in the action anyway.

This is different than actual knowledge.

Actual knowledge

focuses on an employer having the intent to actually harm or kill an employee. Consciously
disregarded knowledge focuses not on the intent to harm an employee, but the intent to engage in
behavior that an employer knows could harm an employee, but to disregard that knowledge. In
other words, the consciously disregarded knowledge prong provides the Appellant with a
different proof to meet the element of general intent than the proof of actual knowledge-which
makes sense given the disjunctive test. If there is evidence showing that the employer had actual
knowledge that its actions would result in harm to an employee, then the actual knowledge prong
of general intent applies. If a worker cannot prove actual knowledge, then the worker must
prove that the employer was consciously aware that its actions could cause harm to employees,
but disregarded that knowledge resulting in that harm.
With these definitions in mind, it is Appellant's position that they have met their burden
of proof on all prongs of the second methodology, whether it be actual knowledge or consciously
disregarded knowledge. Appellants have met their burden to prove that Crookham's conduct in

IOI
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causing Ms. Gomez's death arises to the level of being an offensive action, that the action was
aimed at an employee's body, and that Crookham had 1) actual knowledge that its conduct
would result in harm to an employee; or 2) Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge that
its conduct would result in harm to an employee.
Crookham's conduct in this case was offensive. As set forth above, Crookham has been
in business for 116 years and it is offensive, outrageous, and inexcusable that the rampant safety
violations and problems clearly described by OSHA, the Industrial Hygiene Report, the
Employee Manual, the Safety Manual, the Seed Conditioning Manual, Olga Olvera, the Form
300A, the totality of Dr. Aleksander's expert report, the lack of documented safety inspections,
the lack of documented LOTO training for the picking table, the lack of documented reporting of
near-miss accidents involving the picking table, the lack of documented hazard assessments in
Scancore, the lack of documentation of the unsafe working condition of the picking table, the
lack of any documented on the job training program for safely cleaning the picking table, lack of
warning signs, lack of documented training on the location and operation of emergency shut-offs
could exist at Crookham's facility.

It is offensive, outrageous, and inexcusable that George

Crookham would require the picking table to be cleaned while running constantly during a shift
pursuant to the Seed Conditioning Guide considering his knowledge that the picking table
required LOTO.
Frankly, the mere design effort that was put into the picking table was offensive and
dangerous. In this regard, Mr. Aleksander in his expert report made the following findings and
conclusions regarding the offensive and defective design of the picking table:
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Based upon deposition testimony, the picking table concept was conceived by Mr.
Crookham in discussion with his employees. Crookham Company employees
then designed, procured parts and components, fabricated, assembled, tested,
installed, provided motor and motion power and controls, wired, and placed in
service this picking table. However, Crookham Company did not provide the
necessary guards, warnings, instructions, provisions, or lock-out-tag-out, a means
of safely cleaning the machine, emergency stop controls, or training in the safe
operation of this machine. This machine was designed and implemented entirely
by the Crookham Company, with no evidence of a design or consulting contract
or manufacturing contract with any other entity. There is no evidence of a design
review, a safety review, a standard of any kind, an operational analysis, a job
hazard analysis, or any analysis or for that matter even a drawing or
documentation of any sort whatsoever. In other words, Crookham designed and
manufactured this equipment intentionally ignoring all current engineering,
design safety, OSHA, or any other standard that protects operators and users in
the modern world. 102
Appellants have also met their burden to prove that Crookham's offensive conduct was
aimed at the bodily integrity of an employee. In this regard, Dr. Aleksander reached several
conclusions on this element that both the design of the picking table and the safety violations
committed by Crookham could have just one result-harm to an employee and in this case, death
to Ms. Gomez. Appellants direct the Court's attention to the Case Elements, Discussion and
Analysis, and Summary of Core Opinions sections of Dr. Aleksander's report for a detailed
assessment of the intentional design, manufacturer, and safety defects and violations that directly
lead to Ms. Gomez's death. 103
Furthermore, it is clear not only from Dr. Aleksander's report but also from the Employee
Manual, Safety Manual, and Seed Conditioning Guide that Crookham was very well aware of the
reason for machine guarding, LOTO, safety inspections, safety training, and safety reporting.
102
103

R., pp. 517-529.
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Crookham knew that these items were essential to prevent harm to employees. For that matter,
as set forth above, both 30(b)(6) designees for Crookham testified as to the requirement to use
LOTO and the purpose of LOTO to prevent injury and death to employees. This testimony is a
tacit admission by Crookham under oath that Crookham actually knew that harm to employees
would result from safety violations, such as lack of LOTO-and that is exactly what happened in
this case.
Appellants have also met their burden on the general intent element. For all of the reason
set forth above, the overwhelming weight of the evidence in this case shows that Crookham
actually knew or consciously disregarded knowledge that employee injury would result from the
employer's action. In this regard, Crookham's conduct was beyond a mere individual act of
recklessness. Rather, Crookham's conduct was tantamount to an intentional and systemic abuse
of even the most basic of modern-day safety standards whose sole purpose is the prevention of
injuries and death to employees. 104 Crookham's safety violations and unsafe work culture are
laid bare in this case as a rampant and intentional disregard for employee safety. Crookham
intentionally gambled with the life and health of its employees in order to increase corporate
profits and production efforts and Ms. Gomez died as a result.
Furthermore, the testimony received from Mr. Bennett and Mr. Haylett discussed above
confirms the widespread intentional safety abuses that placed Crookham's employees, including
Ms. Gomez, into a dangerous work environment. Another clear example of the intentional lack
of attention given to the safety of the Scancore employees is found in the deposition testimony of

104
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Nelda Cardona, a Scancore room supervisor. In this regard, Ms. Cardona was provided a copy of
the Guide and asked to comment upon safety provisions and her responsibilities:

Q.

Did you monitor and ensure that your employees in the Scancore room
were cleaning the machines properly?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Now, earlier today, you told me, you don't even watch them clean?

A.
Yeah, but I made sure with-with the assistance of Isabel, to make
sure that it's already cleaned up. I'll go downstairs, and I say, okay.
Everything good? Yeah, everything is good. We already got everything,
blah blah blah. That's good enough for me from her.
Q.
It is your testimony that that conversation, as you just explained it, is
enough to meet your responsibility to monitor and ensure laborers are following
safety procedures?

A.

Yes.

Q.
A.

That's the extent of the effort that you need to give?

It's good enough for me. 105

This is express testimony from the Scancore room supervisor herself that despite all of
the requirements placed upon her by the Employee Manual and the Safety Manual to ensure the
safety of her employees while they clean the machines, she just has to have a "blah blah blah"
conversation with another supervisor and that is "good enough for me".
For the reasons set forth above, in the event the Court determines that the Exclusive
Remedy Rule applies to industrial death claims, the Appellants have met their burden to prove
that the exception to the Exclusive Remedy Rule applies. Therefore, the Exclusive Remedy Rule
is not a bar to any of the Plaintiffs claims.

G.

The District Court committed reversible error in determining that Crookham is
not a manufacturer as defined by the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act.
The Idaho Product Liability Reform Act ("IPLRA") defines a product seller as an entity,

105
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including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or retailer of the "relevant product" who is
"engaged in the business of selling products." I.C. § 6-1407. A manufacturer is then given a
more specific definition. A manufacturer is defined as a product seller who actually designs,
produces, makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures the "relevant product or component
part of a product" before its sale to a user or consumer. It is further noted in the statute that a
product seller acting primarily as a wholesaler, distributor, or retailer of a product may also fit
the definition of a "manufacturer" to the extent that it "designs, produces, makes, fabricates,
constructs, or remanufactures the product before its sale." I.C. § 6-1407(2)(emphasis added).
Product is then defined as "any object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery
either as an assembled whole or as a component part or parts, and produced for introduction into
trade or commerce... " Relevant product is defined as "that product, or its component parts,
which gave rise to the product liability claim." I.C. § 6-1402(3).
The argument by Appellants is simple. It is true that Crookham is in the business of
selling seeds, not sorting tables.

However, Crookham designed, manufactured, fabricated,

installed, and operated a custom seed sorting table with the precise purpose of sorting seeds for
sale. As discussed above, the seed sorting table was so unique and so integral to Crookham's
seed sale business, that Crookham intentionally bypassed a multitude of safety concerns in order
to maximize the output of the seed sorting machine. As a result, the seed sorting machine at
issue in this litigation became as important as the seeds themselves because they had to be sorted
before they could be shipped-even at the risk of decreased employee safety standards. As a
result, under the factual circumstances of this case, the seed sorting machine that was designed
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and built by Crookham that ultimately took Ms. Gomez's life was a component part of the seed
product itself.
VII.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Appellants respectfully request this court reverse the decision of
the District Court, as argued above, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for trial.
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